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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintifftAppellee, 
v. 
VINCENT LAWRENCE PHIPPS 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20050296-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S REYES CLAIM RISES TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."_Statg 
v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74. f 11,10P.3d346. "The preservation rule applies to every claim, including 
constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist 
or'plain error'has occurred." Id. Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would 
explain and excuse a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 
P.2d 65,78 (Utah App.1990). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' 
to assure that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State 
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991). 
"' [Exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed in 
terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment 
that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine does not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue 
on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5,8 (Utah App. 1996). The Utah Supreme Court has similarly 
indicated that they ".. .are obliged to consider [an] argument [not presented in the proceedings below 
when] it is based on a constitutional question and defendant's liberty is at stake." State v. Jamesoa 
800 P.2d 798,802-803 (Utah 1990). In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,1134, fii. 2, (Utah 1994), this 
Court employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State argues that Appellant's claim under Reyes pertaining to 
their reasonable doubt jury instruction was unpreserved at trial and that no exceptional circumstances 
exist to the preservation issue. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 8-9. As argued in the Brief of Appellant, 
neither Appellant's trial attorneys nor any other attorney could have raised the issue of the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction at trial since review had been granted by the Utah Supreme Court after the 
Utah Court of Appeals' determination in State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, which had 
upheld Robertson. It was unforeseeable by any in the legal profession, save possibly those involved 
in Reyes, that the Utah Supreme Court would expressly abandon and overturn an eight-year 
precedence respecting reasonable doubt jury instructions. 
The court found that the element of the Robertson test instructing the jury that the State must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk that a juror may find the defendant 
guilty based on a standard that was lower than reasonable doubt. Reves. 2005 UT 33, TJ30,116 P.3d 
305. Because the jury in this matter was instructed that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that... eliminates all reasonable doubt" there is a substantial risk that one of 
2 
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Appellant's jurors found him guilty based on a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, thus 
violating Appellant's due process rights. 
The fact that Reyes had been granted review by the Utah Supreme Court, but the issue had 
not yet been decided at the time Appellant appeared for trial, colored the failure of Appellant's trial 
counsel to have raised the issue at trial. See, Lopez. The court's decision in Reyes is a 
constitutional change in the law that was not forseeable at the time of trial, which allows this matter 
to fall under the "exceptional circumstances" similarly relied upon in State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 
1134, fii. 2 (Utah 1994). Alternatively, since Appellant's liberty is at stake here and this issue is 
constitutional this Court should be ".. .obliged to consider it even though it was not raised in the trial 
court." State v. Jameson 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). 
H. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR IN THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error 
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel asked the court 
to use the word "obviate" even after the court stated they would use the word "eliminate." "Obviate" 
and "eliminate" are synonyms. Brief of the Appellee at pp. 10-11. The State has failed to cite any 
authority indicating that invited error pertains to unsettled areas of law. Although it appears Utah 
appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of invited error as it pertains to unsettled 
areas of law, sister jurisdictions and federal courts provide guidance as to the issue. See, State v. 
Rothlisberger. 2004 UT App 226, f 14,95 P.3d 1193 ("In circumstances in which Utah courts have 
not definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate for us to turn to decisions and commentators that 
interpret related federal rules for guidance."), cert granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004). 
3 
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Although not controlling, our sister jurisdiction in Colorado provides helpful insight in a 
recent case, stating that "...where an error or omission in jury instructions is attributable to 
inadvertence or attorney incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review for 
plain error rather than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error." People 
v. Hodges. 2005 WL 1645760125 (Colo.App.,2005). While it is clear that the doctrine of invited 
error should not apply, as the Colorado Court of Appeals indicated, the "plain error" doctrine applied 
by them in determining to review under this standard assumes that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court. See. Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svkes. ~ P.3d — , f21,2005 WL 3434444 
(Utah App/) citing State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63- ]15.95 P.3d 276 (quotinz State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 
74, f 13,10 P.3d 346 (to demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is hannfal, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant)). It is 
axiomatic that an error such as a change in law at the appeal stage could not have been obvious to 
the trial court, however, indicating the purpose for the "exceptional circumstances" standard as 
applied in Utah and argued in Appellant's opening brief. 
The federal courts, however, have expanded upon Utah's concept of "exceptional 
circumstances" as it pertains to unsettled areas of law to include what it terms a "plain error" concept 
at the stage of appeal rather than at the trial level. The United States Supreme Court explained in 
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,468,117 S.Ct 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that 
"...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-
it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id The United States 
Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a long and 
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virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing 
precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct at 1549. United States v. Retos. analyzed this issue and 
explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error was plain at time of trial, but 
whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct appeal. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d 
Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport Inc.. the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies to jury instructions and found that 
"...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct 
appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 
F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because, at the time 
of trial, the reasonable doubt jury instruction on which Appellant's counsel was relying was a settled 
area of law. See, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However, at the stage of appeal, 
the law which the instruction had relied upon was abandoned as unconstitutional. See, State v. 
Reves. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of the substantial change in the law from the 
time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the change to the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
should be reviewed under either Utah's "exceptional circumstances" rubric or the expanded "plain 
error" doctrine at the appeal stage, as outlined in Johnson. Retos. and West Indies supra, and not 
the invited error doctrine. 
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did not 
know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in Reyes' case at the time of the trial 
in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true given that two other 
cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45,122 P.3d 543, and State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49,122 P.3d 566, 
5 
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were argued the same day as Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both Cruz and Weaver were 
arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights by not 
having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions. Even those 
parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what that outcome would be given that the 
cases argued at the same time were taking opposing positions to Reyes1. 
In Brief of Appellee, the State cites to State v. Winfield. 2006 UT 4 %\S, and argues that 
Winfield "discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve hidden 
ground for reversal on appeal." Brief ofAppellee, at p. 11. The State also cited to State v. Perdue. 
813 P.2d 1201,1205, in stating that this Court will not "permit a party to set up an error at trial and 
then complain of it on appeal." At the time of the trial in the instant matter, Appellant's trial counsel 
was simply advocating for him based upon current case law at the time. Appellant's trial counsel 
cannot be held responsible for the reversal of the Reves case after the fact. It is obvious that counsel 
in this matter was not attempting to mislead anyone, but was only representing the Appellant's best 
interests. Appellant's trial counsel neither mislead the trial court nor set up an error at trial to 
complain about on appeal. Trial counsel was simply representing and advocating for the Appellant 
based upon case law at the time. 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent. See, e.g., Hodges. 
Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally agreed with the final jury instructions because they were 
unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes would be. It was not possible to object to the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reyes was pending. See e.g., Johnson. 520 U.S. at 468, 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reves in Cruz and Weaver's cases and determined 
that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper standard to the jury 
without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
117 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to object at trial was inadvertent and should be 
reviewed under Johnson's "plain error" standard at the appeal stage, or Utah's original "exceptional 
circumstances" rubric, as argued in Appellant's opening brief. 
Although Appellant's trial counsel insisted that the word "obviate" be used at trial and the 
trial court instructed the jury that the word "eliminate" really meant "obviate," exceptional 
circumstances still arose because use of the word "eliminate" created a substantial likelihood that 
an injustice would result. See. Reves. Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt 
instruction "eliminates all reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was 
found guilty based on a degree of proof that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
required in criminal matters. Id. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellant to be 
found guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt" violated his due 
process rights and, therefore, created a situation of substantial injustice, allowing exceptional 
circumstances to apply. Since Appellant's liberty is at stake and this issue is constitutional, the Utah 
Supreme Court has previously determined that they are "...obliged to consider it even though it was 
not raised in the trial court." State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This unsettled 
interpretation of the law colored the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the issue at trial. 
ffl. REYES DID NOT REQUIRE THE STATE TO ARGUE THAT IT NEED ONLY 
REFUTE DOUBTS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED BY THE JURY 
In the Brief of Appellee, the state attempts to argue that Reves required the State in the instant 
matter to argue that it need only refute doubts that were sufficiently defined by the jury. Brief of 
Appellee, at p. 12, fh. 4. This argument undermines the intent of the Utah Supreme Court in Reves 
to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 
7 
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In Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an extensive analysis of their determination to 
abandon the Robertson test requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt," as more particularly 
set forth in the Brief of Appellant. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 38-39. During this analysis, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also flawed 
because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to 
convict. . .[t]he "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence.. .[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not, however, condition 
a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or 
to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet 
its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
Reyes at f27. This analysis indicates that a juror is legitimate in acquitting when they have a doubt 
based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient, but cannot specifically articulate 
what that doubt may be. Reves at «fl28, citing Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable 
Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 
Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). 
The phrase that the State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" improperly permits the State 
to argue that "it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined," thereby diminishing the 
State's burden. Reves at ^ [12. It is farreaching to believe that, in ^ 
case, a prosecutor would orally articulate to a jury that, if the juror feels doubt but cannot articulate 
or define it, then the State maintains no burden to overcome it. It is clear from the Utah Supreme 
Court's overall analysis in Reves of this issue that it did not intend for prosecutors to have to take 
this step in order for defendants to be protected from the substantial risk inherent in the phrase at 
8 
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issue herein. Reves at f25-30. To require such would be to negate the Utah Supreme Court's 
position on the matter. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING A 
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR A SECOND RATHER THAN THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY 
In the Brief of Appellee the State attempts to argue that the trial court did not abuse it's 
discretion in sentencing Appellant to a second degree felony instead of a third degree felony based 
upon the amount of restitution. Brief of Appellee at p. 12. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-402(1) states as follows: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree 
of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly. 
This Court gives deference to the trial court when reviewing issues of sentencing: 
We traditionally afford the trial court wide latitude and discretion in sentencing.... 
"An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence 
represents an abuse of discretion."... Sentencing requires such discretion because it 
"necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court."... Thus, a sentence imposed 
by the trial court should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive. 
State v. Bovd. 2001 UT 30, f31,25 P.3d 985, citing State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 665,671 (Utah 
1997) (auotine State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133.1135 (Utah 1989)) (other citations omitted). "An 
abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the 
9 
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sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
"An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless it exceeds that 
prescribed by law or [the trial court] otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Wallace. 2004 UT 
App.f2 , 100 P.3d 273, (quoting State v. Breeze. 2001UT App 2001,f 5, 29 P.3d 19 (citations 
omitted)). In State v. Barrett. 2004 UT App 239, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed what the 
discretion of the court is in determining restitution. "A trial court has discretion under the Utah 
Crimes Victims Restitution Act to determine the amounts of restitution. Under the plain language 
of the Act, a court does not, however, have discretion to not make restitution determinations with 
supporting findings. By express language, the Act imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to 
make the appropriate determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the 
decision." See id.§ 77-38a-302(2), (3); see also State v. Stirba , 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). "A defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which 
the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution." 
Id Additionally, 'the statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly 
establishedf.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (2003), State v. Wallace, 2004 UT App, f 3, 
100P.3d273. 
The matter of State v. Mast 2001 UT App., 40 P.3d 1143, is similar to the instant matter. 
In that matter, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for receiving stolen property, lost wages, 
and replacement checks. The defendant only pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charge of 
receiving stolen property but restitution was ordered to be paid for damages resulting from the 
burglary. However, upon review, this Court found that Mast could not be Held responsible for 
10 
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damages caused in the burglary, but only for pecuniary damages resulting from the crime of 
receiving stolen property, because she had not plead guilty or been convicted of the burglary charge 
and ordering her to do so would be in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201. 
The State concedes in its brief that the amount of $1689.54 for the body damage to the Jeep 
Cherokee was excluded from the restitution order to obtain the amount ordered. Brief of Appellee 
at p. 13-14 At trial, the State presented evidence that there was body damage to the Jeep Cherokee, 
but no evidence was presented that it was caused by the Appellant. R121 at p. 102. The evidence 
that was presented at trial consisted of placing Appellant at the scene of the broken the windows of 
the vehicles and blood evidence that was found on one of the windows, determined to belong to 
Appellant. No evidence was presented linking the Appellant to the body damage of the Jeep 
Cherokee, and the trial court's re3titution order simply clarified the jury's determination. 
There are no findings that exist in the record to show that the Appellant was responsible for 
the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee and, therefore, this amount was not included in the amount 
of restitution. Absent the amount of the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee, which was $1,689.54, 
the restitution amount came to $4,658.09, or less than the $5,000 required to make the criminal 
mischief charge a second degree felony. No findings were made in the record by the court showing 
that the body damage was intended to be part of the restitution nor was there any evidence presented 
that the Appellant was responsible for this damage. Since the amount of restitution reflected was 
under the actual amount of $5,000 proven and found by the jury, the trial court abused it's discretion 
in sentencing the Appellant to a second degree felony since the damage was not over the $5,000 as 
required by statue. 
11 
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« 
V. POLICE TRANSCRIPT OF APPELLANT'S PHONE CALL WAS NOT 
PROPERLY ADMITTED 
In the Brief of Appellee the State attempts to argue that the police transcript of the telephone 
call was either properly admitted or that it amounted to nothing more than harmless error if it was 
• 
not properly admitted. Brief of Appellee at p. 16-17. The State's argument ignores established Rules 
of Evidence and diminishes the jury's role at trial. 
I t is the role of the jury to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses." 
State v. Dav, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 
(Utah App. 1990)). "A jury, in its role as a fact finder, must weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses." State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799,802 (Utah 1977V As stated by UT. R. 
EviD. 403, "[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
The basis of our jury system is to allow a randomly selected group of our peers to weigh the 
evidence and pass judgment thereon in determining credibility. In the instant matter, by providing 
the jury with a transcript when the audiotape itself is the "best evidence," the trial court allowed the 
State to substitute their ears for those of the jury. There is a substantial risk that the transcript in this 
matter could have misled the jury. 
Appellant's trial counsel objected to the transcript being admitted as evidence by stating, 
"[w]e'U object to that, your Honor. The tape speaks for itself. The jury has heard it, can hear it and 
make their own decisions as to what it says. That's the best evidence." R121:138. The court 
reserved ruling on that objection at that time in order to do some research on the best evidence rule, 
12 
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but eventually allowed the transcript to be received as evidence i^nstructing the jury that the best 
evidence was the tape itself. Rl 21:144. 
The trial court's instruction to the jury did not cure the error. The fact that the jury had a 
copy of the transcript while they were deliberating allowed the jury to be misled by examining 
evidence that was not the best evidence available. It is axiomatic that the jury would simply review 
the transcript while deliberating rather than listen to the audio tape, even though instructed that the 
audio tapes were the best evidence. Allowing the jury to have a copy of the transcripts while they 
were deliberating gave the jury the opportunity to be misled by relying on the transcripts and not the 
audio tape. 
The State makes mention in the Brief of Appellee that the trial court would have been "'happy 
to receive9 any alternative interpretations" of the transcript. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. At the time 
of the trial, there were no other transcripts on which the court could rely. However, now at the 
appeal stage of the instant matter we have the official transcripts with which we can compare the 
unofficial ones submitted by the State. In comparing these two transcripts, there are discrepancies 
in the number of "inaudibles." In the court reporter's account of the message which was transcribed 
while the tape was being played for the jury, there is a greater amount of "inaudibles" than those 
contained in the uncertified transcript that was admitted into evidence. Compare R121 at p. 137, 
line(s) 3-15; and State's Exhibit No. 14. There are also discrepancies as to the language in each. 
Id, This is very prejudical to Appellant, since the jury may have relied only upon what was in the 
unofficial transcripts in reaching their verdict. This may have caused the jury to reach a verdict 
based upon unreliable evidence. 
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In the Brief of Appellee, the State relies on the case of State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22 % 20,20 
P.3d 888, to show that the admission of the transcript would not have affected the outcome of the 
proceedings and that if it did it would have been harmless error. The State attempts to use Evans to 
show that 'there is no reasonable likelihood that [admission of the police transcript] affected the 
outcome of the proceedings" and that, if it did, it was only harmless error. Allowing the transcript 
to be admitted could have substantially effected the outcome of the proceedings and was not 
harmless error. The admission of the transcripts could have affected the outcome of the proceedings 
by allowing the jury to render a verdict based upon misleading and unreliable evidence. This is an 
error that would not have been harmless. Allowing the jury to rely upon a transcript during 
deliberations that was unofficial, even though the jury was instructed that the audio tapes were the 
"best evidence," is not harmless. Relying on those transcripts instead of the audio tapes would be 
harmful and detrimental to the Appellant in that the jury may have rendered a guilty verdict based 
upon unreliable evidence. If the transcripts had not been admitted, then no error could have 
occurred. Allowing those transcripts to be admitted is not harmless error and a very real likelihood 
exists that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
VI. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 
ARGUE FOR ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT NO. 17 FOR IMPEACHMENT 
PURPOSES. 
The State in its brief states that Appellant did not address Issue Number "5" in its opening 
brief, although it was listed under his Statement of Issues caption. Brief of Appellant, p. 1. 
Appellant did address this issue under the exclusionary argument as Argument I (A). The 
exclusionary argument itself was withdrawn by motion after the filing of Appellant's opening brief; 
however Issue "5" was not withdrawn. 
14 
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Where new counsel represents a defendant on appeal and the record is adequate to review 
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, this Court reviews those claims as 
a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim," 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient 
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.' 
w
 Wickhamv.Galetka. 2002 UT 72, 19, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,243 
(Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,686-87,104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984). 
On direct examination by the State at trial, Aaron Rodman testified that, on the night of 
December 28,2003, he was watching a movie around 1:30 a.m. when he heard some "loud bangs, 
windows break" outside. Rl 21 at p. 179. However, in Rodman's original statement dated December 
28,2003, he stated that he was in his bedroom playing a game early that morning when he heard a 
"thud" and "some yelling" around 1:30 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. and heard some people running each way 
up the block. See, Exhibit No. 17 (not admitted at trial). 
At trial, Mr. Rodman's original statement was offered as Exhibit No. 17 by Phipps' trial 
counsel, William Benge, and objected to by the State as a hearsay statement. Rl 21 at p. 182. Benge 
indicated he was offering the exhibit as proof of being inconsistent with Rodman's original 
testimony, but only to the extent that Benge had thought Rodman previously testified that he had 
actually seen people running up the street rather than just hearing them running up the street, as his 
statement indicated. Id. The trial court stated that it was not its recollection that Mr. Rodman had 
testified as to having seen anyone, and the trial court asked Benge if that was his only reason for 
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offering the exhibit. R121 at p. 182. Benge still offered it and the State stood by their objection. Id. 
at p. 183. The court ruled that ". . .it has to be offered for a prior inconsistent or inconsistent 
statement. Inconsistent when attacking. Consistent when (inaudible). If you are attacking, then it 
has to be inconsistent. I didn't see that. So objection sustained." R121atp. 183. 
The court did not allow Rodman's statement to be admitted since Benge failed to recognize 
and argue the inconsistencies that did exist in Rodman's statement versus his testimony. Compare, 
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181 -184 with Exhibit No. 17. Rodman's statement indicated he was playing a game 
and heard a "thud." Exhibit No. 17. Rodman testified that he was watching a movie and heard 
"loud bangs, windows break" outside. R121 at p. 179. It is clear that Rodman's statement should have 
been admitted to challenge Rodman's credibility; however, Benge failed to recognize these 
inconsistencies since he was focused on the fact that he believed Rodman had testified that he saw, 
rather than heard, someone running up the street. Id. at p. 182. With the focus of the trial being a 
determination as to who broke the windows, this inconsistency was important to point out. Given 
the time that had passed since the incident and the fact that Rodman's was one of only two witnesses 
who aided in determining when the incident occurred, it is clear that Phipps was prejudiced by 
Benge's failure to argue the inconsistencies that did exist in Rodman's statement versus his 
testimony. 
It is difficult to judge the affect a matter of credibility would have upon a jury had they been 
given the opportunity to consider Rodman's inconsistent statement in its deliberations. Had the jury 
discredited Rodman, the time in which the incident occurred would have been left to question and 
the jury may have given more credibility to Phipps' alibi defense. Phipps was prejudiced by Benge's 
ineffectiveness with respect to Rodman's statement and testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Brief of 
Appellant filed in this matter, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Judgment. 
DATED this (Q day of //JcewA , 2006. 
K. Andrew Fitzgerak 
Attorney for VincenlHCawrence Ph 
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